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20 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF AND THE PUTATIVE CLASS

21 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
22 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
23 **SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

24 ALAN CLARIDGE, individually and on
25 behalf of all others similarly situated,
26
27 Plaintiff,

28 v.

ROCKYOU, INC., a Delaware corporation,
29
30 Defendant.

) Case No. 09-CV-6032 -VRW

) **FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR:**

-) **(1) Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2702**
-) **(2) Violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200**
-) **(3) Violations of Cal. Penal Code § 502**
-) **(4) Violations of Cal. Civ. Code § 1750**
-) **(5) Breach of Contract**
-) **(6) Breach of Implied Contracts**
-) **(7) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**
-) **(8) Negligence**
-) **(9) Negligence Per Se**

) **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

) **CLASS ACTION**

1 Plaintiff, by and through his attorneys, upon personal knowledge as to himself and his
2 own acts, and upon information and belief as to all other matters, alleges as follows:

3 **NATURE OF THE ACTION**

4 1. Plaintiff, Alan Claridge (“Claridge”), brings this class action complaint
5 against RockYou, Inc. (“RockYou”) for failing to secure and safeguard its users’ sensitive
6 personally identifiable information (“PII”), including e-mail addresses and passwords and
7 login credentials for social networks such as MySpace and Facebook. RockYou knowingly
8 violated its own terms of service and accepted, long-standing industry standards by failing to
9 take commercially reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff and the Class members’ PII.

10 2. RockYou is a publisher and developer of popular online services and
11 applications for use with social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, hi5 and Bebo.

12 3. RockYou stored users’ PII in an unencrypted database with commercially
13 unreasonable network security. RockYou’s knowing and willful failure to secure its users’
14 sensitive PII led to multiple security breaches that exposed the PII of 32 million users. The
15 exposed PII was freely published and re-published many times on the Internet, making the
16 information available to public at large.

17 4. While some security threats are unavoidable in a rapidly developing technological
18 environment, RockYou knowingly and willfully failed to take even the most basic steps to
19 protect its users’ PII by leaving the data entirely unencrypted and available for any person
20 with a basic set of programming skills to take the PII of at least 32 million consumers.

21 **PARTIES**

22 5. Plaintiff Alan Claridge is a resident of Evansville, Indiana. He is a registered
23 user of RockYou, Inc.’s services.

24 6. Defendant RockYou, Inc. is a California corporation headquartered in San
25 Mateo County, California, at 585 Broadway Street, #A, Redwood City, California 94063.
26 RockYou does business throughout the State of California and the nation.

1 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

2 7. This Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
3 1331. The Court also has jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332(d), because (a) at least one member
4 of the putative class is a citizen of a state different from Defendant, (b) the amount in
5 controversy exceeds \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and (c) none of the
6 exceptions under the subsection apply to this action.

7 8. Personal jurisdiction and Venue are proper because RockYou is a corporation
8 headquartered in San Mateo County and/or because the improper conduct alleged in the
9 Complaint occurred in, was directed from, and/or emanated or exported from California.

10 **INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT**

11 9. Pursuant to Local Civil Local Rule 3-2(d), this case shall be assigned to either
12 the San Francisco or Oakland Division.

13 **FACTS**

14 10. RockYou offers a variety of services for use through online social networks
15 such as Facebook and MySpace. These services include applications to share photos, write
16 special text on a friend's page, or play games with other users. Once a user begins operating
17 a RockYou application on a social network site, RockYou utilizes that application as a
18 platform to display paid advertisements. RockYou claims to be the leading provider of social
19 networking application-based advertising services, with more than 130 million unique
20 customers using its applications on a monthly basis.

21 11. A customer may sign up to use RockYou's applications through rockyou.com
22 by providing a valid e-mail address and a registration password. RockYou then stores this e-
23 mail address and password in a database. Additionally, and depending upon which online
24 social network a customer chooses to utilize RockYou's products, a user may be required to
25 provide RockYou with an email address and the password for that email account and/or a
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1 username and password for accessing the particular social network. RockYou also stores this
2 information in its database.

3 12. RockYou asserts through its website that it will safeguard its users sensitive
4 PII. RockYou's Privacy Policy specifically states:

5
6 Our Commitment To Data Security: RockYou! uses
7 commercially reasonable physical, managerial, and technical
8 safeguards to preserve the integrity and security of your
9 personal information. We cannot, however, ensure or warrant
10 the security of any information you transmit to RockYou! and
11 you do so at your own risk. Once we receive your transmission
12 of information, RockYou! makes commercially reasonable
13 efforts to ensure the security of our systems

10 13. Plaintiff and the Class agreed to RockYou's Terms of Use and Privacy Policy
11 in order to register and use RockYou's products.

12 14. Plaintiff and the Class members relied on RockYou's misrepresentation that it
13 used commercially reasonable safeguards to preserve the integrity and security of their
14 personal information.

15 **RockYou's Unencrypted and Unprotected Storage of PII**

16 15. RockYou collects and stores millions of users' PII in a large-scale commercial
17 database, claiming in its privacy policy to use "commercially reasonable" methods of data
18 protection. However, until approximately December 5, 2009, RockYou's database stored
19 users' PII in "clear" or "plain" text, meaning there was no form of encryption preventing an
20 intruder from easily reading and removing the sensitive PII. Under widely accepted
21 standards, storing users' PII in clear text is fundamentally outside the bounds of modern
22 database security and a significant risk to the integrity of a user's PII.

23 16. Clear text passwords are not stored in a cryptographically protected form, and
24 therefore are readily accessible to anyone with access to the database. This means that once
25 a hacker gains access to a network or database system, there is no further barrier or
26 protection to removing e-mail addresses and passwords as they are presented without
27

1 encryption or additional security. Those with access—authorized or unauthorized—may
2 read the passwords as easily as one can read the words in this Complaint.

3 17. By way of analogy, a properly protected database could be compared to the
4 safety deposit box room at a bank. At any major bank, the hundreds of safe deposit boxes are
5 found inside a walk-in-safe, but then additionally protected by individual two-key locked
6 doors. In the website context, the outer safe door represents basic network security that
7 prevents a hacker from getting anywhere close to a database. However, in the event that a
8 thief is able to bypass the outer safe door, he will encounter a significant second layer (or
9 more) of security to thwart his intentions. RockYou not only left the outer safe door entirely
10 open (as detailed below), but also, left the individual safety deposit boxes open with their
11 contents on display.

12 18. Among the options available to protect its customers' PII, RockYou could
13 have followed a commonly used method of protecting sensitive data that requires conversion
14 and storage of a "hashed" form of a plain text password.¹ A properly designed hash function
15 will make it virtually impossible to decipher the original plain text password.

16 19. RockYou failed to use hashing, salting, or any other common and reasonable
17 method of data protection and therefore drastically exacerbated the consequences of a hacker
18 bypassing its outer layer of web security.

19 **Consumers' E-Mail and Password Unlocks Endless Amounts of Sensitive PII**

20
21 20. The information stored in RockYou's user database is a very powerful set of
22 PII, including email login credentials and email account credentials.

23
24 ¹ Under this method, when a user inputs a password, the software runs through a
25 cryptographic hash algorithm, and if the hash value generated from the user's input matches
26 the hash stored in the database, access is permitted. A hash value is created by applying a
27 hash function to a string consisting of the submitted password and another value known as a
28 "salt." The salt prevents attackers from easily building a list of hash values for common
passwords.

1 21. By failing to secure its users' PII, RockYou made email account and social
2 networking account access available to even the least capable hacker.

3 22. These login credentials were freely published many times on the Internet,
4 making the information available to the general public.

5 23. A person's email account and/or social networking account act as modern day
6 filing cabinets for a variety of interactions, transactions, and correspondence.

7 24. Accordingly, access to email accounts and social networking accounts allow
8 wrongdoers to access private information, to access communications with third-parties, and
9 to send false messages to other persons thereby causing reputational and financial damage to
10 the accountholder.

11 **The Attack on RockYou's Database**

12 25. On December 4, 2009, the online security firm Imperva, Inc. notified
13 RockYou of a security problem with its SQL database.² Imperva specifically informed
14 RockYou that it had become aware of a SQL injection flaw³ as a result of monitoring
15 underground hacker forums. According to Imperva, hackers were regularly discussing
16 RockYou's SQL injection vulnerability and the fact that it was being actively exploited.

17 26. SQL injection flaws have consistently been among the top online security
18 problems of the past decade. For example, in 2007 and 2008, hackers took advantage of a
19 SQL injection flaw to steal 130 million credit card numbers stored on the databases of
20

21 ² Like thousands of commercial website operators who collect user information, RockYou
22 utilizes a Structured Query Language ("SQL" (pronounced "sequel")) database. SQL is
23 a database computer language designed for storing data in relational database management
24 systems such as when a company needs to store and manage millions of e-mail accounts and
25 passwords.

26 ³ A SQL injection flaw allows a hacker to take advantage of improperly coded web software
27 to introduce malicious code into a company's network. A hacker may capitalize on the
28 improperly coded software to send a malformed SQL query to the underlying database to
access the information contained in it, plant malicious code, or access other systems on the
network.

1 Heartland Payment Systems, 7-Eleven, and Hannaford Brothers. The attack was widely
2 publicized and is regarded as the largest case of identity theft in American history, re-
3 emphasizing the danger SQL injection attacks pose to commercial database security.

4 27. Because knowledge and understanding of SQL injection flaws has been
5 widespread for more than a decade, measures for protection have become readily available.
6 SQL injections flaws, therefore, are easy to prevent and are well known to any web
7 developer handling a large-scale commercial website.

8 28. Based on its own findings, Imperva believed that prior to warning RockYou, it
9 was likely that breaches had already occurred through RockYou's SQL injection flaw.
10 Additionally, Imperva informed RockYou that its researchers were aware that RockYou
11 users' webmail accounts had been accessed as a result of prior breaches.

12 29. The SQL injection flaw was disproportionately hazardous to RockYou's users
13 because RockYou had failed to encrypt its users' PII. Therefore, once a hacker got inside
14 RockYou's network, there was no encryption or other mechanism to prevent access to
15 RockYou's users' PII.

16 30. Had RockYou properly secured its database through known and available
17 encryption methods, and even if a hacker were able to enter the network, he would be limited
18 in his ability to inflict harm. For example, a hacker still might be able cause temporary
19 internal havoc in the operation of the site, or "vandalize" the appearance of the site by
20 altering its code, but under the appropriate and necessary security, a hacker would not be able
21 to steal 32 million sets of user PII because the data would be encrypted and indecipherable.

22 31. However, because RockYou did not have this security in place, RockYou's
23 security flaw was being actively exploited and the contents of its database were known and
24 made public through underground hacker forums on or before November 29, 2009.

25 32. By failing to employ commercially reasonable methods to prevent a long and
26 well-known method of attack, RockYou knowingly, intentionally, and willfully provided
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1 access to its database of its users' PII, thereby allowing hackers to steal, copy, or otherwise
2 use the user data.

3 33. In a December 15, 2009, interview conducted by SCMagazineUS.com,
4 Imperva's chief technology officer, Amichai Shulman, reports:

5
6 Others probably hacked into the database even earlier,
7 Shulman said. Imperva researchers initially discovered the
8 vulnerability after coming across a thread on a hacking forum,
9 where hackers discussed the flaw and said it was being actively
10 exploited.

11 "It was probably compromised before we warned them about
12 it," Shulman said. He added that Imperva researchers are
13 certain that some webmail accounts have been accessed as a
14 result of the breach.

15 "I can tell you for sure that some of them have been accessed,"
16 Shulman said. "We know that for a fact. We looked at some of
17 those accounts and they were already flagged as abused by the
18 webmail providers."

19 "SQL injection is one of the oldest tricks in the book of
20 application-level hacking and it allows direct access to the
21 database through the web app," Shulman said.⁴

22 34. Based on RockYou's own press release, after Imperva warned it of the SQL
23 injection vulnerability and the high likelihood of prior breaches, RockYou "immediately
24 brought down the site and kept it down until a security patch was in place."⁵

25 35. However, RockYou did not in fact respond immediately to the warning and
26 waited at least one day to take action to repair the SQL vulnerability. According to an
27 interview conducted by NetworkWorld.com with Imperva's chief technology officer,
28 Amichai Shulman, "RockYou did not respond to Imperva, nor did it appear to immediately
take down its site as it claimed in its statement to TechCrunch, Shulman said. The flaw was

29 ⁴ [http://www.scmagazineus.com/rockyou-hack-compromises-32-million-
passwords/article/159676/](http://www.scmagazineus.com/rockyou-hack-compromises-32-million-passwords/article/159676/)

30 ⁵ <http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/14/rockyou-hacked/>

1 present for a day or more after Imperva informed RockYou of the issue before it was
2 addressed he said.”⁶

3 36. In the time prior to RockYou fixing the SQL vulnerability, at least one
4 confirmed hacker known by the moniker “igigi” accessed RockYou’s database and accessed
5 and copied the email and social networking login credentials of approximately 32 million
6 registered RockYou users.

7 37. This hacker accessed and copied the user information prior to Imperva’s
8 warning, and therefore entered RockYou’s database without detection. Further, by entering
9 the database prior to Imperva’s warning, the hacker acted with separate and independent
10 knowledge of RockYou’s vulnerability.

11 38. In an interview with RockYou’s Chief Technology Officer, Jia Shen, Digital
12 Beat reported that after Imperva notified RockYou of its security vulnerability, “the company
13 began poring through its databases to find any evidence of attack. Shen said the company
14 doesn’t know exactly what the hacker did in the attack. The company is in contact with law
15 enforcement but isn’t saying more. ‘But we are assuming the worst,’ Shen said. ‘We checked
16 the activity and it looked like it had been going on a couple of days before we were warned.’
17 Mr. Shen continued, ‘We started off as a small company and today we have a different
18 engineering structure,’ he said. ‘But shame on us. If you make a mistake, then people can get
19 in and it is a big hole.’”⁷

20 39. On information and belief, the “activity” referred to by Mr. Shen was in fact
21 not the individual hacker known as “igigi” who publically claimed to have accessed the
22 database, but one or more different individuals.

25 ⁶ [http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/121509-rockyou-hack-exposes-names-
26 passwords.html?page=1](http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/121509-rockyou-hack-exposes-names-
26 passwords.html?page=1)

27 ⁷ [http://digital.venturebeat.com/2009/12/15/rockyou-explains-how-a-hacker-stole-32-million-
28 passwords-and-what-its-doing-about-it/](http://digital.venturebeat.com/2009/12/15/rockyou-explains-how-a-hacker-stole-32-million-
28 passwords-and-what-its-doing-about-it/)

1 40. On information and belief, RockYou did not utilize any software designed to
2 identify actual or potential attacks.

3 41. In a statement issued after RockYou publically announced the security breach,
4 RockYou stated that “one or more individuals illegally breached one of our databases that
5 contained the usernames and passwords for about 32 million users in an unencrypted
6 format.” While RockYou indicated that updates and increased security were put in place
7 following the breach, it acknowledged that at the time of the breach, the hacked database had
8 not been up-to-date with regard to “industry standard security protocols.”⁸

9 42. Implicit in RockYou’s statement is the admission that the security methods it
10 utilized to protect user PII did not meet even the most basic industry standards and
11 knowingly exposed its users’ information to attack and theft.

12 43. The National Institute of Standards and Technology provides basic network
13 security checklists addressing the very inadequacies present on RockYou’s servers.⁹ The
14 failure of a large online service provider such as RockYou to act pursuant to these basic
15 security checklists discredits its assertion that it employed commercially reasonable measures
16 to secure PII.

17 44. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has filed complaints against
18 corporations claiming to secure customer data while remaining vulnerable to SQL injection
19 attacks in the same manner as RockYou.¹⁰ In the referenced case, the FTC filed a complaint
20 in 2003 against the ‘Guess?’ clothing company. The complaint alleges that despite a posted
21 policy ensuring reasonable Internet security measures, ‘Guess?’ stored customers’ PII in an
22 unencrypted database concomitantly with poor website security that permitted SQL injection
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24 _____
25 ⁸ <http://www.rockyou.com/help/securityMessage.php>

26 ⁹ National Checklist Program Repository, <http://checklists.nist.gov>

27 ¹⁰ *In the Matter of Guess?, Inc. and Guess.com Inc.*, (Case No. C-4091) (FTC, July 30, 2003)
28 (available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/guesscomp.pdf>).

1 attacks. The FTC argued that these practices constituted unfair or deceptive practices
2 affecting commerce in violation of federal law.

3 **RockYou's Business Model**

4 45. RockYou makes products and services in the form of online applications to be
5 used in conjunction with online social networks.

6 46. RockYou's consumers pay for RockYou's products and services with their
7 personal information. Put another way, RockYou's consumers buy RockYou's products and
8 services by paying RockYou in the form of email account and social networking logins that
9 provide access to highly valuable personal information. Put yet another way, RockYou's
10 consumers exchange something valuable—access to their personal information—for
11 RockYou's products and services *and* RockYou's promise to employ commercially
12 reasonable methods to safeguard their valuable personal data.

13 47. RockYou is able to make money this way, despite not directly charging its
14 consumers for its products and services, because of the monetary value of access to its users'
15 personal information.

16 48. RockYou describes itself as a “unique social application-based advertising
17 network.” In other words, RockYou makes money by selling advertising space, not wholly
18 unlike a newspaper or television program.

19 49. But because RockYou has access to highly personal information about its
20 consumers, RockYou's advertising platform is particularly attractive to advertisers and
21 marketers who can use that personal information to direct highly targeted ads to RockYou's
22 customers. In other words, RockYou's products and services are merely vehicles to acquire
23 personal data about consumers in order to sell that personal data to advertisers.

24 50. If not for the inherent and identifiable value of access to personal consumer
25 data, RockYou could not exist. Thus, its promises concerning the safeguarding of the
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1 personal consumer data RockYou receives in exchange for its products and services are vital
2 to its business and to its consumers.

3 51. The practices described above—providing services to consumers and profiting
4 from selling their personal information to third-parties online—has burgeoned into a multi-
5 billion dollar per year industry.¹¹ This business model is so successful and promising that
6 RockYou has raised well in excess of \$100 million in venture capital during its short
7 existence.

8 **FACTS RELATING TO PLAINTIFF**

9 52. During the relevant time period, Alan Claridge was a registered account
10 holder with RockYou. He registered with RockYou on August 13, 2008.

11 53. In signing up to utilize a photo sharing application offered by RockYou,
12 Claridge submitted his e-mail address and a password to RockYou.

13 54. On or around December 15, 2009, Claridge received an e-mail from RockYou
14 informing him that his sensitive PII stored with RockYou may have been compromised
15 through a security breach.

16 **CLASS ALLEGATIONS**

17 55. Plaintiff Alan Claridge brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)
18 and (3) on behalf of himself and a Class of similarly situated individuals, defined as follows:

19 All individuals and entities in the United States who had RockYou
20 accounts in 2009.

21 Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its legal representatives, assigns, and successors, and
22 any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest. Also excluded is the judge to whom
23 this case is assigned and the judge's immediate family, as well as any individual who
24 contributed to the unauthorized access of RockYou's database.

25
26 ¹¹ Unboxed – Rewarding Consumers for Providing Personal Data,
27 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/business/18unboxed.html?_r=1

1 56. The Class consists of millions of individuals and other entities, making joinder
2 impractical.

3 57. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all of the other members of the
4 Class.

5 58. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the
6 other members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in
7 prosecuting complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to
8 vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and have the
9 financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interest adverse to
10 those of the other members of the Class.

11 59. Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of
12 litigating their claims to be prohibitive and will have no effective remedy. The class
13 treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions
14 or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and
15 promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication.

16 60. RockYou has acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to
17 Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, requiring the Court's imposition of uniform
18 relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class.

19 61. The factual and legal bases of RockYou's liability to Plaintiff and to the other
20 members of the Class are the same and resulted in injury to Plaintiff and all of the other
21 members of the Class. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have all suffered harm as
22 a result of RockYou's wrongful conduct.

23 62. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff
24 and the other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that
25 may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are
26 not limited to the following:
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- 1 (a) whether RockYou failed to use reasonable care and utilized
- 2 commercially reasonable methods to secure and safeguard its users' sensitive
- 3 PII;
- 4 (b) whether storing user e-mails and passwords in an unencrypted format
- 5 was commercially reasonable;
- 6 (c) whether RockYou's conduct violates the Stored Communications Act,
- 7 18 U.S.C. § 2702;
- 8 (d) whether RockYou's conduct described herein violated the Unfair
- 9 Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, *et seq.*);
- 10 (e) whether RockYou's conduct described herein violated California's
- 11 Computer Crime Law (Cal. Penal Code § 502);
- 12 (f) whether RockYou's conduct describe herein violated the California
- 13 Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1750);
- 14 (g) whether RockYou's conduct described herein constitutes a breach of
- 15 contract;
- 16 (h) whether RockYou's conduct described herein constitutes breach of the
- 17 implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing;
- 18 (i) whether RockYou's conduct described herein constitutes breach of
- 19 implied contracts;
- 20 (j) whether RockYou's conduct described herein was negligent and/or
- 21 grossly negligent; and,
- 22 (i) whether RockYou's conduct described herein constitutes negligence
- 23 per se;

24 63. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise these definitions based on facts learned in
25 discovery.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of the federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702

(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

64. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

65. The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) contains provisions that provide consumers with redress if a company mishandles their electronically stored information. The SCA was designed, in relevant part, “to protect individuals' privacy interests in personal and proprietary information.” S.Rep. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), *reprinted in* 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, at 3557.

66. Section 2702(a)(3) of the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) provides that “a provider of remote computing service or electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service.” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3).

67. The SCA defines “remote computing service” as “the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2). The definition of “electronic communication service” under the SCA is “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” *Id.* at § 2510(15).

68. Under the SCA an “electronic communication means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).

69. An “electronic communications system” is further defined by the SCA as “any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14).

1 competition. An unlawful business practice is anything that can properly be called a business
2 practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.

3 78. As described herein, Defendant's knowing and willful failure to safeguard and
4 secure its users' sensitive PII violates the UCL.

5 79. Commonly accepted and widely practiced industry standards provide that
6 sensitive PII stored in a commercial database should be not be accessible to theft or
7 manipulation through a SQL injection attack, and commercially reasonable methods to
8 prevent such attacks are widely known throughout the security industry. Further, commonly
9 accepted and widely practiced industry standards provide that sensitive PII stored in a
10 commercial database, especially user passwords, should be not be stored in "clear" text, but
11 rather encrypted to provide a barrier to removal or manipulation.

12 80. RockYou failed to expend the resources necessary to protect the sensitive data
13 entrusted to it by Plaintiff and the Class in clear contradiction of accepted industry standards
14 for database security. In creating the perception that it followed industry standards for
15 database protection, RockYou gained an unfair advantage over its competitors.

16 81. Additionally, RockYou deceived consumers by providing in its Terms of Use
17 that it "uses commercially reasonable physical, managerial, and technical safeguards to
18 preserve the integrity and security of your personal information . . . Once we receive your
19 transmission of information, RockYou! makes commercially reasonable efforts to ensure the
20 security of our systems."

21 82. By failing to protect against SQL Injection attack, RockYou failed to use
22 commercially reasonable safeguards to protect its consumers' personal data.

23 83. By failing to maintain its consumers' personal data in an encrypted database,
24 RockYou failed to use commercially reasonable safeguards to protect its consumers'
25 personal data. Storing sensitive PII in clear text is not commercially reasonable.

26 84. On information and belief, RockYou has not taken any steps to prevent
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1 continued disclosures of its user data online.

2 85. Plaintiff and the Class members relied on RockYou's misrepresentations that
3 it would employ commercially reasonable methods to safeguard their personal data.

4 86. By failing to employ commercially reasonable methods to safeguard its users'
5 personal data, RockYou violated its own written policy, as publicly provided in its Privacy
6 Policy.

7 87. Defendant has violated the "unlawful" prong of the UCL because its conduct
8 as alleged herein violated the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702, the Consumer
9 Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 *et seq.*, and the California Computer Crime Law,
10 Cal. Penal Code § 502.

11 88. Defendant has violated the fraudulent prong of the UCL by misrepresenting to
12 its users that it would use commercially reasonable methods to safeguard and secure their PII
13 in order to induce reliance on its statements for commercial gain.

14 89. Defendant has violated the unfair prong of the UCL because it operated a
15 business that induced consumers to submit PII with the written assurance that the data would
16 be protected through commercially reasonable methods. Defendant knowingly failed to
17 provide any commercially reasonable security methods.

18 90. Defendant's unfair or deceptive practices occurred primarily and substantially
19 in California. Decisions concerning the retention and safeguarding of user information were
20 made in California, RockYou maintains all or a substantial part of its computer systems
21 containing user information in California, and the security breach of its computer systems
22 took place primarily and substantially in California.

23 91. As a result of RockYou's conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and Class
24 members have lost money and/or property. They have lost money in the form of the value of
25 their personal data. They have lost property in the form of their breached personal data,
26 which is of great value to RockYou, RockYou's advertisers, and wrongdoers.

1 112. The Agreement's provisions constitute a valid and enforceable contract
2 between Plaintiff and the Class on the one hand, and Defendant on the other.

3 113. Under the terms of the contract, Plaintiff and the Class members agreed to pay
4 RockYou in the form of their valuable personal data in exchange for RockYou's products
5 and services and RockYou's promise to use commercially reasonable safeguards for their
6 consumers' user data.

7 114. Under the Agreement, in order to use Defendant's social networking
8 applications, Plaintiff and the Class transmitted several pieces of sensitive PII to Defendant,
9 including but not limited to their e-mail addresses and corresponding passwords. In turn,
10 under the Agreement Defendant promised that "RockYou! uses commercially reasonable
11 physical, managerial, and technical safeguards to preserve the integrity and security of your
12 personal information." Defendant further promised that it would provide Plaintiff and the
13 Class with prompt and sufficient notice if their sensitive PII was compromised.

14 115. Defendant materially breached the terms of the Agreement by its wrongful
15 conduct alleged herein, including failing to properly secure its databases, thereby allowing
16 Plaintiff's and the Class's sensitive PII to be compromised. Defendant further materially
17 breached the terms of the Agreement by failing to promptly and sufficiently notify Plaintiff
18 and the Class that their sensitive personal information had been compromised.

19 116. As a result of Defendant's misconduct and breach of the Agreement described
20 herein, Plaintiff and the Class suffered injury. Plaintiff and the Class members did not
21 receive the benefit of the bargain for which they contracted and for which they paid valuable
22 consideration in the form of their personal information, which has ascertainable value to be
23 proven at trial.

24 **SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

25 **Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

26 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

1 117. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein,
2 excluding paragraphs 110-116).

3 118. Plaintiff hereby pleads in the alternative to the Fifth Cause of Action.

4 119. In order to use Defendant's social-networking applications, Plaintiff and the
5 Class affirmatively assented to Defendant's Terms of Use Agreement.

6 120. The Agreement's provisions constitute a valid and enforceable contract
7 between Plaintiff and the Class on the one hand, and Defendant on the other.

8 121. Implicit in the Agreement were contract provisions that prevented Defendant
9 from engaging in conduct that frustrated or injured Plaintiff and the Class's rights to receive
10 the benefits of the Agreement.

11 122. Defendant's obligation to take commercially reasonable steps to safeguard
12 and secure Plaintiff and the Class's sensitive PII from unauthorized access and theft was a
13 material term of the Agreement.

14 123. Furthermore, implicit in the terms of the Agreement was Defendant's
15 obligation to comply with Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*, Cal. Penal Code § 502,
16 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.80, *et seq.*, and Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, *et seq.*

17 124. Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
18 failing to safeguard and secure Plaintiff's and the Class's sensitive PII from unauthorized
19 access and theft, failing to promptly and sufficiently notify Plaintiff and the Class that their
20 sensitive PII had been compromised, and further by failing to fully comply with the
21 proscriptions of applicable statutory law. In so doing, RockYou acted consciously and
22 deliberately.

23 125. Defendant's misconduct and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
24 fair dealing as described herein resulted in injury to Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff and the
25 Class members did not receive the benefit of the bargain for which they contracted and for
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1 which they paid valuable consideration in the form of their personal information, which has
2 ascertainable value to be proven at trial.

3 **SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

4 **Breach of Implied Contracts**

5 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

6 126. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein,
7 excluding paragraphs 110-125.

8 127. Plaintiff hereby pleads in the alternative to his Fifth and Sixth Causes of
9 Action.

10 128. In order to use Defendant's social-networking applications, Plaintiff and the
11 Class transmitted several pieces of sensitive PII to Defendant, including their e-mail
12 addresses and corresponding passwords.

13 129. By providing that sensitive PII, and upon Defendant's acceptance of such
14 information, Plaintiff and the Class, on the one hand, and Defendant, on the other hand,
15 entered into implied contracts whereby Defendant was obligated to take commercially
16 reasonable steps to secure and safeguard that information.

17 130. Under the implied contract, Defendant was further obligated to provide
18 Plaintiff and the Class prompt and sufficient notice of any and all unauthorized access and/or
19 theft of their sensitive PII.

20 131. Without such implied contracts, Plaintiff and the Class would not have
21 provided their personal information to Defendant.

22 132. By failing to properly secure Plaintiff and the Class's sensitive PII, and further
23 by failing to notify Plaintiff and the Class that their personal information had been
24 compromised, Defendant breached its implied contracts with Plaintiff and the Class.

25 133. Defendant's breach and other misconduct described herein resulted in injury
26 to Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff and the Class members did not receive the benefit of the
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1 bargain for which they contracted and for which they paid valuable consideration in the form
2 of their personal information, which has ascertainable value to be proven at trial.

3 **EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

4 **Negligence**

5 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

6 134. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

7 135. In order to use Defendant's social-networking applications, Plaintiff and the
8 Class transmitted several pieces of sensitive PII to Defendant, including their e-mail
9 addresses and corresponding passwords.

10 136. By agreeing to accept Plaintiff and the Class's sensitive PII, Defendant
11 assumed a duty, which required it to exercise reasonable care to secure and safeguard that
12 information and to utilize commercially reasonable methods to do so.

13 137. Defendant failed to protect its databases against SQL injection attacks and
14 other security vulnerabilities, failed to encrypt Plaintiff and the Class member's passwords,
15 and failed to provide Plaintiff and the Class with prompt and sufficient notice that their
16 sensitive PII had been compromised, thereby breaching its duties to Plaintiff and the Class.

17 138. By failing to take proper security measures to protect Plaintiff and the Class's
18 sensitive PII as described herein, Defendant's conduct was grossly negligent and departed
19 from all reasonable standards of care.

20 139. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's failure to exercise reasonable
21 care and use commercially reasonable security measures, its databases were accessed without
22 authorization and Plaintiff and the Class's sensitive PII was compromised.

23 140. That security breach and resulting unauthorized access to Plaintiff and the
24 Class's sensitive PII was reasonably foreseeable by Defendant, particularly in light of the fact
25 that the method used to access Defendant's databases—an SQL injection attack—was well-
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1 known within the industry and had been successfully guarded against by companies similar
2 to Defendant for approximately a decade prior to the instant breach.

3 141. Neither Plaintiff nor the other members of the Class contributed to the security
4 breach described herein or to the unauthorized access of their sensitive PII.

5 142. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's misconduct described herein,
6 Plaintiff and the Class were injured because they suffered the public disclosure of personal
7 information without consent and because they were deprived the benefit of the services for
8 which they bargained and for which they paid valuable consideration in the form of their
9 personal information, which has ascertainable value to be proven at trial.

10 **NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

11 **Negligence Per Se**

12 **(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

13 143. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

14 144. Defendant's violations of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702,
15 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*, Cal. Penal Code § 502, *et seq.*, and Cal. Civ. Code
16 § 1750, *et seq.*, resulted in injury to Plaintiff and the Class.

17 145. The harm Defendant caused to Plaintiff and the Class are injuries that result
18 from the type of occurrences those statutes were designed to prevent.

19 146. Plaintiff and the Class are the type of persons for whose protection those
20 statutes were adopted.

21 147. Defendant's violations of the foregoing statutes as described herein resulted in
22 injury to Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff and the Class members did not receive the benefit
23 of the bargain for which they contracted and for which they paid valuable consideration in
24 the form of their personal information, which has ascertainable value to be proven at trial.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Class, prays for the following relief:

A. Certify this case as a class action on behalf of the Class defined above, appoint Alan Claridge as class representative, and appoint his counsel as class counsel;

B. Declare that RockYou's actions, as described herein, violate the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702, the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, *et seq.*, the Computer Crime Law, Cal. Penal Code § 502, and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 1750), and constitute breach of contract, or in the alternative, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or in the alternative, breach of implied contract, as well as negligence and negligence per se.

C. Awarding injunctive and other equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of the Class, including, *inter alia*: (i) an order prohibiting RockYou from engaging in the wrongful and unlawful acts described herein; (ii) ensuring that RockYou user data does not appear in Internet search engines; and (iii) requiring RockYou to protect all data collected through the course of its business in accordance with industry standards;

D. Award damages, including statutory damages where applicable, to Plaintiff and the Class in an amount to be determined at trial;

E. Award Plaintiff and the Class their reasonable litigation expenses and attorneys' fees;

F. Award Plaintiff and the Class pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent allowable; and

G. Award such other and further relief as equity and justice may require.

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JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury for all issues so triable.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: August 12, 2010

By: s/ Michael Aschenbrener
Michael Aschenbrener
EDELSON MCGUIRE LLC
One of the Attorneys for Plaintiff

PROOF OF SERVICE

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The undersigned certifies that, on August 12, 2010, he caused the document titled FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT to be electronically filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of filing to counsel of record for each party.

s/ Michael J. Aschenbrener
Michael J. Aschenbrener